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1 Introduction 
1.1  Introducing the topic; background, scope and definitions 
 
1.1.1  Background 
In light of the on-going negotiations between Norway and China on a Free Trade 
Agreement, hereafter FTA, the Department of the Environment of Norway seeks to 
establish whether and how environmental concerns and policies should be considered 
and could be integrated into the FTA. The aim of this thesis is to evaluate possible 
environmental provisions in a Sino-Norwegian FTA, within the framework of a 
scenario defined as a “Green Trade Scenario”.  
 
A Green Trade Scenario, as defined by the working group for the report to the Ministry 
of the Environment, consisting of Ole Kristian Fauchald and Haakon Vennemo, is 
based on a free trade scenario. In the Green Trade Scenario, the “measures to secure 
free trade are complemented by additional measures to enhance trade’s positive 
environmental impacts, and safeguard against negative impacts”.1 The Green Trade 
Scenario will include both recommendatory and mandatory provisions.  
 
1.1.2  Scope of the thesis 
The aim of the thesis is to give an overview of relevant international and bilateral 
agreements and their status as a basis for an analysis of the special topics relevant for 
the Sino-Norwegian FTA under a Green Trade Scenario. Environmental provisions are 
a diverse and interesting group of regulations, often inter-related, and are found in many 
different designs in trade agreements. I have omitted treating the regulation of 
environmental goods and services, investment provisions and agricultural subsidies. 
 
There is no universal definition of environmental goods and services (EGS), but an 
OECD working group has defined the EGS industry as consisting of activities “which 
produce goods and services to measure, prevent, limit, minimize or correct 
                                                 
1
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environmental damages”2. The EGS field has, to a large extent, been worked on 
separately, but it is closely linked to other areas of development in trade research and 
negotiation.
3
 A study of EGS would in itself be too extensive to include in this thesis in 
a meaningful way.  
 
Investments in relation to trade have also been dealt with separately in most trade 
research.
4
 Similar to EGS, investments in relation to trade and environment is such a 
large field of study that it is not useful to include it in this thesis.  
 
Agricultural subsidies are mostly regulated separately from other subsidies, and they are 
both a complicated as well as disputed topic in international trade. Also, Norway and 
China trade mostly in non-agricultural products, making agricultural subsidies 
irrelevant in a Sino-Norwegian context.
5
  
 
1.1.3  Definition of environmental provisions 
For the sake of this thesis, when I use the term “environmental provision” I mean any 
general environmental provision included in a trade agreement, as well as other 
provisions, for example exception clauses, that are clearly related to environmental 
regulation. I shall not discuss any provisions that do not explicitly take the environment 
into consideration or have a clear link to the environment. 
 
Many of the trade agreements that include environmental provisions are of recent date. 
The empirical evidence of the effectiveness of environmental provisions in free trade 
agreements is therefore limited. Importantly, an issue to take notice of is that much of 
the research that has been conducted has focused on post-ratification changes. Only 
very recently has research been done on the effects that the negotiations of trade 
agreements have on environmental policies.
6
 This research shows that environmental 
policies change through the negotiations, before the ratification date. Hence trade 
                                                 
2
 OECD Policy Brief, September 2005, page 2 
3
 WTO, Eliminating trade barriers on environmental goods and services, 2011 
4
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Jacques et. al., October 2007, page 72 
5
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agreements have a greater impact on the development of environmental policies than 
has previously been thought. Due to the fact that the research conducted on the impact 
of trade agreements in general is limited, I will primarily analyse the agreements 
themselves as a basis for my thesis. 
 
Although empirical evidence is limited, a number of theories regarding the relationship 
between trade and environment exist. Many of these theories concern the possible 
negative impacts on the environment of increased trade, including the theories on race-
to-the-bottom, regulatory chill and the creation of pollution havens. Other theories have 
highlighted the potentially positive impact from trade on the environment. 
 
The debate on trade and the environment has been ongoing since the 1970s.
7
 This has 
resulted in regulations within the WTO framework that deal with the relationship 
between free trade and environmental concerns. Most multi- and bilateral trade 
agreements also include environmental provisions, but there is great diversity in both 
the extent of included environmental provisions and their design.  
 
In this thesis I will identify some general trends regarding both policy-making in terms 
of trade agreements and discussions on the mitigation of possible negative impacts on 
the environment. I will not attempt to make detailed conclusions, but rather illustrate 
general trends, and apply these conclusions to the context of a Sino-Norwegian FTA.   
  
1.1.4  The relationship between trade and the environment 
The environmental provisions in trade agreements vary greatly, taking into 
consideration in particular the relevant countries’ levels of development and whether or 
not they have common borders.
8
 Several theories on the effect on the environment of 
trade have emerged, among the most well-known being the race-to-the-bottom theory, 
the theory on regulatory chill and the pollution-haven theory. All three theories 
conclude that free trade has a negative impact on the environment. Also, the so-called 
                                                 
7
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8
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Kuznets curve
9
 on the relationship between per capita income and environmental 
degradation is often cited as an important theory. The curve illustrates that higher levels 
of income, over a certain point, will lead to an increase in demand for environmental 
quality.
10
 Yet other articles point to a more diversified environmental impact, singling 
out certain goods that, through free trade, are associated with negative environmental 
impacts.
11
 The information available in this field of study is vast, but empirical and 
systematic evidence confirming or disproving any of the hypotheses is scant. I will 
return to this discussion in Section 3 on mitigating environmental challenges due to free 
trade.  
 
Although the research is inadequate and inconclusive, policy-making has nevertheless 
followed the precautionary principle, a well-established principle in international 
environmental law. Since the impact of trade on the environment is difficult, if not 
impossible to map, the environmental regulations agreed upon in trade agreements have 
aimed to mitigate possible negative effects. Regulations designed to enhance the 
positive effects of trade on the environment are not as common, but they do exist in 
some of the agreements that I have studied. 
 
The level of environmental mitigation varies according to the levels of regulation and 
development in the countries party to the agreement. In many trade agreements 
involving two parties of an uneven development level, the party with low environmental 
standards is required to introduce higher policy standards in order to gain access to the 
market of the party with high environmental standards. The market access is ensured 
through lower tariffs and the dismantling of other trade barriers.
12
  
 
In the case of Norway and China, Norway is considered a high policy standard level 
country.
13
 China, although having made considerable progress, is still considered a 
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country of low environmental standards, mainly due to a lack of implementation.
14
 The 
World Economic Forum publishes The Global Enabling Trade Report, where countries 
are ranked according to a number of indexes, including tariff levels. Norway was 
ranked number 7, and China number 48 out of a total of 125 countries.
15
 The potential 
for the dismantling of trade barriers is clearly greater for China than for Norway. It 
would be useless for Norway to require the introduction of a higher environmental 
policy level in China, since China’s access to Norway is anyway not limited to any 
large extent.  
 
 
1.2 The Sino-Norwegian Free Trade Agreement 
1.2.1  Background of trade negotiations between Norway and China 
China was unwilling to negotiate an FTA with EFTA as a group, and hence the EFTA 
states are negotiating individually with China.
16
 Norway has not negotiated a bilateral 
FTA outside the EFTA system since the early 1990s. The EFTA FTAs have not 
extensively regulated environmental concerns, apart from the most recent FTA with 
Hong Kong, China, which was signed in 2011. Norway wishes to include more 
environmental regulation in the EFTA FTAs, and also in their bilateral FTAs.
17
 Hence, 
the Norwegian-Chinese FTA negotiations are important in setting precedence for how 
environmental provisions could and should be included in future Norwegian bilateral 
trade negotiations.  
 
1.2.2  Existing environmental cooperation between Norway and China  
Norway and China have about a decade’s history of environmental cooperation18. The 
cooperation has so far been restricted to specific sectors, such as water resources, 
maritime research, fisheries cooperation or the reduction of mercury. There have also 
been a series of environmental projects conducted in China, both commercial and non-
commercial. Most of the cooperation has been short term, spanning only 3-5 
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years.
19
The access to knowledge and technology from Norway has been the most 
important benefit for China.
20
  
 
Norway and China have a complex environmental cooperation, based on MoUs
21
, 
bilateral agreements in specific areas such as fisheries and shipping
22
, various capacity 
building projects
23
, and environmental cooperation projects. Much of the environmental 
cooperation is organized through political rather than legally binding agreements, 
which, together with the complexity of the cooperation, makes it difficult to make a 
comprehensive and exact overview of the current status of this cooperation.  
 
Researchers have suggested that the exchange of knowledge and training of Chinese 
experts in Norway should be prioritized. As for Norwegian interests in institutional 
cooperation, it has mainly been the “attractiveness of tied grant aid offered on terms not 
requiring any open tender for use, in one of the world’s fastest growing markets”.24 
Whereas the first is relevant for this thesis, the latter falls out of its scope as it concerns 
economic provisions that are not directly related to environmental aspects of an FTA.  
 
 
1.3 Defining agreements of interest to which Norway and China are parties 
1.3.1 The World Trade Organization Agreements  
Norway has been a WTO member since the 1
st
 of January 1995, and China became a 
member on the 11
th
 of December 2001. There are numerous agreements to which WTO 
members are party. In this thesis I will focus the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), because they 
both contain relevant environmental regulation. Where relevant I will also refer to the 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the WTO agreement). I will not 
deal with intellectual property, as this falls outside the scope of environmental 
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provisions I wish to analyse. In addition to the GATT and GATS, there are agreements 
dealing with the special requirements of specific sectors or issues, such as subsidies and 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Where relevant, I will include these issues.  
 
Norway and China are also subject to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. There 
are currently several cases pending, some against China, that concern environmental 
considerations within the WTO framework. This emphasises the relevance of the 
WTOs’ role in international trade and environmental regulation. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the WTO agreements are trade agreements, but they do include 
reference to, and regulation of, certain environmental issues. Seeing that both Norway 
and China are parties to the WTO, and that the WTO regulations are frequently being 
used in multi- and bilateral trade agreements, an analysis of the original WTO 
regulations is of interest.  
 
1.3.2  China’s existing FTAs 
China currently has six bilateral FTAs in addition to an FTA with ASEAN (the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and FTAs with Hong Kong and Macau.
25
 For 
the purpose of comparison, I have chosen to omit the agreements with Hong Kong and 
Macau as the conditions upon which the agreements are based are so different from 
those that the Norwegian-Chinese agreement will be based on, that a comparison will 
not be relevant. As for the China-ASEAN FTA, it does not contain any environmental 
provisions, and is therefore not relevant in this thesis. 
 
As for the six bilateral FTAs, the one between China and Costa Rica only came into 
force on the 1
st
 of August 2011, and has not been in force long enough to evaluate in 
any meaningful way. The remaining five FTAs came into force during the period of 
2006 to 2008. These are also relatively recent agreements, but are nevertheless 
interesting because some of them have very different approaches to environmental 
provisions.  
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The China-Pakistan FTA has reference to environmental issues only in the Preamble. 
Both the China-New Zealand FTA and the China-Chile FTA refer to separate 
Environmental Cooperation Agreements (hereafter “ECAs”). The China-Singapore and 
China-Peru FTAs are by far the FTAs that include the most extensive regulations of 
environmental issues in the FTA text itself. The variation of environmental regulation in 
these agreements shows that China has a pragmatic approach to environmental 
regulation within the framework of FTAs. The challenge is therefore to estimate what is 
both possible and useful to include in the Norwegian-Chinese FTA. 
 
1.3.3  Norway’s existing FTAs 
As part of the EFTA (the European Free Trade Association), Norway is part of FTAs 
through EFTA, i.e. together with Iceland, Lichtenstein and Switzerland. Norway has 
very few FTAs independent of EFTA, and the EFTA FTAs are therefore the only 
sources of extensive information on the status of the Norwegian FTAs. EFTA has 
negotiated FTAs since the early 1990s. Until 2010 environmental provisions were not 
part of the EFTA trade negotiations. The only FTA that has been signed since 
environmental provisions were included into the EFTA FTA negotiations is the FTA 
with Hong Kong, China, signed on the 21
st
 of June 2011.
26
 Needless to say, there is no 
research yet on the implications of the environmental provisions of this FTA.  
 
In addition to the FTA with Hong Kong, EFTA has made a draft model of 
environmental provisions, which is also a useful source of information about EFTA 
policies on this issue.
27
 I have also received information that Norway was the key 
advocate for including environmental provisions in the FTA, and the model provisions 
are therefore particularly useful in assessing the Norwegian approach to environmental 
regulation in FTAs.
28
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 EFTA-Hong Kong, China FTA, 2011 
27
 EFTA Consolidated draft model provisions, 2010 
28
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1.4 Defining relevant international agreements  
1.4.1 Introduction and scope  
The scope of environmental obligations in international trade agreements varies 
substantially. Some of the models for environmental provisions are consistent for the 
countries or associations that are parties to the agreement. The EFTA FTAs, for 
example, are consistent in including reference to the environment only in the preamble 
to the agreements (with the exception of the EFTA-Hong Kong FTA).
29
 Many of the 
EUs FTAs, on the other hand, include environmental provisions. As for the existing 
Chinese FTAs, there is very little literature on the environmental obligations within the 
FTAs. The Chinese FTAs also vary greatly in how they address environmental issues, 
ranging from none in the Sino-Pakistani FTA (2007) to separate Environmental 
Cooperation Agreements (ECA) in the Sino-New Zealand FTA (2008) and the Sino-
Chilean FTA (2006). The North American Free Trade Agreement, on the other hand, 
establishes a separate agreement on the environment which extensively regulates 
environmental cooperation.  
 
Some of the trade agreements mentioned include somewhat similar provisions. 
Examples of such provisions include the obligation to enforce the parties’ own 
environmental laws, commitment to harmonisation of environmental laws and reference 
to the inappropriateness of lowering environmental standards.  Most of the provisions 
are not easily enforceable, and many are designed as general obligations of the parties. 
This is partly because of the nature of environmental regulation; when one does not 
know what dangers to the environment might arise in the future, it is impossible to 
implement detailed and specific measures to prevent them. The regulation of 
environmental goods and services (EGS) and investments, on the other hand, can be a 
lot more specific; the parties are free to define what EGS are, and what kind of 
investments are considered, and propose legislation thereafter.  
1.4.2  The North American Free Trade Agreement 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada, and 
Mexico came into force on the 1
st
 of January 1994. The NAFTA has an agreement on 
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 Annex1, Preambles 
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the environment attached: the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation (NAAEC). The NAAEC is considered to be the trade-related agreement 
that most extensively regulates environmental concerns. Meaningful conclusions can 
also be drawn from the NAFTA and NAAEC since they have been in force for quite 
some time. Hence the NAFTA and NAAEC are useful reference points in analysing 
potential environmental regulation in trade agreements.  
 
Importantly, the NAFTA creates a regional free trade area where the three countries to a 
large extent are each other’s main trading partners. An extensive agreement on both 
trade and the environment is more viable between such parties than in other bilateral 
relations. This is due both to the complexity of having to deal with many equally 
extensive trade agreements, and the cost of the institutions necessary to make such 
agreements enforceable. In the Sino-Norwegian context, an equally extensive regulation 
is unrealistic. Parts of the NAAEC of NATFA environmental regulation could, 
however, possibly be included in a Sino-Norwegian FTA.  
 
Several reports have been written about the NAFTA and the NAAEC, and there is some 
literature available that analyses the agreements as well. The NAFTA and NAAEC are 
among the most well-documented international trade related agreements. Similar 
reports or analysis have not been made, or are not available, for the other trade 
agreements I have studied.  
 
1.4.3  The European Union Free Trade Agreements 
The European Union currently has four bilateral FTAs: with Chile, Mexico, South 
Korea and South Africa. The agreements with Mexico and Chile came into force in 
2000 and 2002 respectively. According to EFTA
30
, these agreements are judged to be 
obsolete in terms of environmental regulation. Firstly, the agreement with Mexico was 
the first FTA to include environmental provisions at all, and was not even subject to a 
sustainability impact assessment (SIA). The FTA with Chile was the first agreement for 
which a SIA was conducted, and the SIA has been described as an attempt at estimating 
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the impacts of the FTA.
31
 The European Commission has launched its first formal 
evaluation on the broader impacts of the EU-Chile FTA, but the results have not yet 
been published. 
 
Environmental issues have been increasingly focused on in EU FTAs. The most recent 
agreement, the EU-South Korea FTA which came into force on the 1
st
 of July 2011, 
offers better indicators on the focus on environmental provisions in the EU FTAs. The 
position paper published in 2010, concludes that the FTA is unlikely to have significant 
adverse environmental effects, as both parties to the agreement face common global 
environmental challenges.
32
 The EU-South Korea FTA itself includes several separate 
references to the environment, as well as a separate chapter on the environment.  
 
The EU FTAs are interesting because they all include some sort of environmental 
regulation. The increased focus on and regulation of environmental issues in the latest 
FTAs indicates that the environmental regulation so far has not been futile, and that 
there is a general trend towards including environmental provisions in European trade 
agreements.  
 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis  
I will start by analysing the WTO framework for environmental regulation in Section 2. 
In the Sino-Norwegian context these regulations have to be considered regardless of 
whether the parties wish to include environmental regulation in their FTA. I will then 
deal with how similar provisions in other bilateral trade agreements are designed in 
order to establish what design solutions could be possible in a Sino-Norwegian context.  
 
Because the design of environmental provisions varies greatly, I have chosen to 
categorize them according to their objectives. In Section 3 I analyse provisions that aim 
at mitigating environmental challenges caused by free trade. Section 4 deals with 
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provisions that aim at enhancing the positive effects of trade on the environment, 
including the analysis of two specific tools: eco-labelling and environmental 
development zones.  
 
 
 
2  WTO environmental provisions and corresponding provisions in 
other agreements   
 
Norway and China are both parties to the WTO, and as such subject to the WTO 
agreements. Although environmental issues can be defined so that many WTO 
regulations will apply to them, I have chosen to focus on the three most specific 
regulations in the GATT and GATS agreements as regards the environment. I will 
provide an overview of the wording and use of the preamble of the agreements, the 
exception clauses and the subsidies regulations that fall within the scope of this thesis. 
A question that applies to all these three mechanisms is the extent to which countries 
that are parties to the WTO agreement can regulate environmental concerns in separate 
trade agreements. The WTO does contain restrictions. These I will briefly introduce 
before discussing them in further detail in relation to the three topics of preamble, 
exception clauses and subsidies regulations that follow. 
 
In order to analyse the relationship between an FTA and the WTO obligations, I will 
start by discussing how the GATT agreement itself regulates its own application in 
relation to free trade agreements. The key point is whether or not a trade agreement falls 
within the scope of what is defined as a free trade agreement according to the WTO 
agreements. If a trade agreement falls within the scope of the WTO definition of a free 
trade agreement, the agreement is subject to certain procedural rules. The WTO 
agreements themselves do not in detail define what a free trade agreement is. Article 
XXIV of the GATT agreement, however, regulates customs unions and free trade areas. 
The article’s 8 b) provides the only definition (that I have been able to find) of a free 
trade area. It states that a free trade area is “a group of two or more customs territories 
in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated on 
 13 
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories”. The content of the article 
is disputed.
33
 Over time, several working parties have been established to examine the 
compatibility of an FTA and GATT rules, and in almost all groups there has been a 
great difference in points of view.
34
 Trade agreements also differ greatly in structure 
and content, ranging from agreements that focus mainly on trade in goods, to 
agreements that include investments, services, sustainable development etc. Defining 
specifically what constitutes a free trade area is difficult due to the differences in the 
agreements themselves and the development of new and more extensive trade 
agreements. For FTAs that include environmental provisions, this uncertainty 
constitutes a challenge in defining whether environmental clauses can be considered to 
be subject to the procedural rules that apply if the FTA falls within the scope of GATT 
article XXIV 8 b). 
 
In the following I will discuss the use of preambles, exception clauses and subsidies 
assuming that the agreements in which they are regulated fall within the WTO 
definition of a free trade area and hence are governed by WTO rules.  
 
2.1  Preamble 
A preamble is an opening statement that declares a document’s purpose. It typically 
includes the background of an agreement and a common understanding of goals. In the 
following, I will provide an overview of the preamble to the WTO agreement (see 
Annex 1), and how it is used and referred to within the WTO system, after which I will 
analyse how the environment is referred to in the preambles of other trade agreements I 
have studied. I have not found any literature on the use of preamble text as a means of 
interpretation in bilateral trade agreements, and also there are no available dispute 
settlement reports for the bilateral trade agreements. My analysis of these is therefore 
limited to conclusions based solely on the wording of the FTAs themselves. 
 
The preamble to the WTO agreement states that the organisation’s goal is to work on 
trade while “allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with 
                                                 
33
 Matsushita, Mitsuo, 2010 
34
 Ibid. 
 14 
the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the 
environment”35. This can be interpreted to mean that one of the WTOs objectives is to 
preserve and protect the environment, hence establishing an indirect link between trade 
liberalisation and environmental protection. The Appellate Body of the WTO 
emphasizes the importance of the preamble in the context of environmental issues in at 
least two separate cases. In the first case, US-Gasoline, the Appellate Body emphasised 
the importance of the preamble in the context of environmental issues.
36
 In the second 
report, US-Shrimp, the Appellate Body referred to the preamble in interpreting the 
meaning of “exhaustible natural resources” in another WTO regulation.37 Although the 
Appellate Body Reports do not have formal precedence, they are indicators of how 
provisions are to be interpreted and are often quoted in later decisions by the Appellate 
Body itself. Also the Vienna Convention of 1969 (VCLT) states that the preamble is 
relevant for the interpretation of an agreement.
38
 As a result, the wording of the WTO 
preamble can be significant if the interpretation of other parts of the WTO agreements 
is uncertain. According to the VCLT, the preamble is significant in any agreement. In 
the following I will look more closely at the wording in the preambles of the other 
agreements I have studied. 
 
All the FTAs I have studied, except the China-Singapore FTA, include reference to the 
environment in their preamble, (see Annex 1). Categorizing the preambles is a 
challenge because they are very different in design, and also in how they relate to the 
agreement as a whole. In the following I will categorize the agreements I have studied 
according to how they refer to the environment in their preambles. I will begin with the 
agreements that directly link the preamble to the content of the FTA by stating how the 
FTA should be implemented. I will then move on to the agreements that indirectly link 
the preamble and the FTA by referring to the interdependent relationship between trade 
and the environment. Then I will treat the FTAs that include no specific link between 
                                                 
35
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38
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the preamble and the FTA text, by including only a general reference to the parties’ 
commitment to promote the environment.  
 
The China-Chile, China-Pakistan and China-Peru FTAs all include the same paragraph 
in their preambles concerning the environment. The paragraph states that the parties 
recognize that the agreement should be “implemented” with a view that would, amongst 
other goals, “promote sustainable development in a manner consistent with 
environmental protection and conservation”.39 This is similar to the wording of the 
EFTA-Hong Kong FTA which states that the parties are “determined to implement [the] 
agreement in line with the objectives to preserve and protect the environment”. The EU-
South Korea FTA has a somewhat different approach, but also refers to the 
implementation of the agreement in a manner consistent with the objectives of 
developing and enforcing environmental laws and policies.
40
The NAFTA preamble, 
similarly to the EU-South Korea FTA, includes specific reference to environmental law 
development. It states that the parties resolve to “strengthen the development and 
enforcement of environmental laws and regulations”41. The EU-South Korea FTA 
includes an article 1.1 (h) that states that one of the objectives of the agreement is to 
promote foreign direct investment without lowering environmental standards or 
affecting enforcement of environmental laws. The parties to the EU-South Korea FTA 
hereby follow up on what they express in the preamble, although article 1.1 only states 
the objectives of the agreement and does not provide an enforceable regulation. In the 
case of NAFTA, however, the side agreement, the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), includes more extensive regulation of 
environmental laws through an enforcement provision and a not-lowering-standards 
clause, which I will return to later in Section 3.3.2. These provisions appropriately 
reflect the parties’ wishes as expressed in the preamble of the NAFTA. The NAFTA 
and the EU-South Korea FTA preambles are examples of how the FTA content is 
directly linked to the preamble.  
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The preambles that indirectly link their reference to the environment to the content of 
the agreement do so by referring to the interdependent relationship between trade and 
the environment. The China-New Zealand and the EFTA-Singapore FTA preambles are 
the only two preambles I have studied that include a statement of such a link between 
trade and the environment. The China-New Zealand FTA states that social and 
economic development and environmental protection are mutually reinforcing factors. 
In other words, environmental sustainability is not, in principle, seen as something that 
might prevent or prohibit economic or social development.
42
 The EFTA-Singapore FTA 
differs somewhat in wording, but also expresses the parties’ understanding that trade 
and environmental development are related. It states that the parties recognize that trade 
liberalisation should allow for the protection and preservation of the environment.
43
  
 
The EU-Mexico and EU-Chile FTA preambles include no specific link between the 
preamble and the rest of the agreement. The EU-Mexico FTA includes reference to 
Agenda 21 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which is the 
only FTA preamble to include such a reference of all the preambles I have studied.
44
 In 
this regard, the EU-Mexico FTA preamble can be understood to include a commitment 
to the principles set out in the Agenda 21, but these are not pursuantly linked to the 
FTA. The EFTA-Chile and the EFTA-Mexico FTA preambles similarly only confirm 
the parties’ understanding of the importance of environmental protection, but do not 
directly or indirectly link the issue of environmental protection to the FTA.
45
 As 
previously mentioned, the EFTA FTAs, except the EFTA-Hong Kong FTA, do not 
include any environmental provisions. Hence the references in the preambles are the 
only information we have as regards the parties’ perception of environmental issues in 
relation to the FTAs. Consequently, the environmental references in the preambles are 
likely to be important as indicators of how to deal with environmental challenges that 
arise within the scope of the relevant FTA, in spite of the fact that they do not include a 
link between the environment and the FTA itself.    
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The FTA preambles that I have studied include reference to the environment in all but 
one case. It is an easy way of including the parties’ concerns for the environment into a 
trade agreement, since the preamble is not legally binding, but relevant for the 
interpretation. The reference to the environment in the preamble, if directly linked to the 
agreement, such as in the EU-South Korea FTA on strengthening environmental laws, 
most likely has a greater impact if it is elaborated upon in a provision in the agreement 
itself. An indirect link between trade liberalisation and environmental protection, such 
as in the WTO agreement or the EFTA-Singapore FTA, can also be important for the 
interpretation of other provisions of the agreements. Including only a statement of the 
parties’ understanding of the importance of environmental protection is also an option, 
but such an unspecific link between the goal of environmental protection and the other 
obligations of the agreement might make the preamble less important in the 
interpretations of the other agreement obligations.  
 
In light of some reference to the environment being common in the FTAs I have 
studied, it seems natural that a Sino-Norwegian FTA should also include reference to 
the environment in its preamble. How much impact this has will depend on the design 
of the preamble, the wording of the rest of the agreement, and how much Norway and 
China respectively emphasize the preamble in their interpretation of their obligations.  
 
2.2 Exception clauses 
In this section I will discuss so-called exception clauses. I will use the term exception 
clause as it is used in the GATT and GATS context. The clauses lay out a number of 
specific instances in which WTO members may be exempted from the main 
GATT/GATS rules. I will only deal with those exceptions that are of particular 
relevance to the protection of the environment. It is of particular interest to compare the 
WTO exception clauses and similar exception clauses in bilateral trade agreements. A 
main issue is whether a trade agreement can include environmental promotion and 
protection as an exception, without expanding the scope of the exception clause 
intended by the WTO.  
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A recent and until now unresolved issue that makes exception clauses particularly 
relevant is that China has appealed a Panel Report on a dispute concerning the export of 
certain raw materials from China. The Panel found that China could not use the general 
exceptions in GATT Article XX to justify its WTO-inconsistent export duties, and even 
if it could have applied the exception clause, it had not complied with the requirements 
of the clause. China’s arguments that the export restrictions on raw materials were 
necessary to promote higher growth and that growth makes environmental protection 
more likely, were rejected by the Panel.
46
 We do not know how the Appellate Body will 
conclude, but the pending case stresses the fact that the exception clauses are in use and 
are disputed. In the following I will examine the GATT/GATS exception clauses and 
similar exception clauses in the FTAs I have studied.  
 
2.2.1  Exception clauses in the GATT and GATS 
There are several multilateral agreements under the WTO, two of the most important 
being the agreement on tariffs and trade, (GATT), and the agreement on trade in 
services, (GATS). Both these agreements contain general exception clauses, in which 
member states may be exempted from their obligations in certain cases, (see Annex 2). 
Both the GATT and GATS contain an exception clause that may apply when it is 
“necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health”47. Only the 
GATT, however, includes an exception for measures “relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources”48.  
 
These exception clauses have been subject to the Appellate Body’s analysis on a few 
occasions. Although the WTO Analytical Index is not an authoritative source of WTO 
interpretation, it gives an indication of how the Appellate Body in certain cases 
interprets WTO regulations. In the following, I will refer to these cases where relevant. 
The WTO is an organization that deals mainly with trade, and expecting them to 
develop a detailed framework for environmental issues would be futile. Also, the nature 
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of the exception clause is so that is impossible to exhaustively define the content of it. 
This leaves room for interpretation, which I will study in the following.  
 
The purpose of the exception clauses related to environmental issues is that the member 
states should be able to choose their own environmental policies, and determine their 
own level of environmental protection.
49
 Both the GATT and GATS exception clauses 
include a three-tiered assessment which may result in the applicability of the exception 
clause. First, the measure at hand must fall within the application area of the relevant 
agreement. Secondly, the measure at hand must come under the particular exception (of 
relevance for the environment; (b) or (g) for GATT and (b) for GATS). Finally, the 
measure must fulfil the requirements of the “chapeau” to the exception clauses, which, 
briefly explained, ensures that the measure in question is applied in good faith.
50
 I will 
not elaborate on the interpretation of this last condition, as it is not necessary for this 
introduction of the exception clauses, and would be too lengthy to be fruitful in this 
context. I will, however, study the content of the second condition. 
 
The exception that is included in both agreements, (“necessary for the protection of 
human, animal or plant life or health”)51, in itself consists of two legal assessments: the 
first one on whether or not the content of the measure falls within the range of the 
exception, and the second, whether or not the measure is “necessary”.52 Regarding the 
first requirement of the measure, of whether it falls within the range of protection of 
human, animal or plant life or health, it has been claimed that the Appellate Body does 
not strictly scrutinize this condition.
53
 For example, it has concluded that certain 
measures can only be evaluated after a certain time has passed, and hence that this 
requirement must be applied with a long-term scenario in mind. In general, there are no 
environmental experts on panels, and therefore the requirement of a measure being for 
the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, is not stringently assessed.
54
 The 
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necessity requirement includes a number of different assessments, such as the 
importance of the interests protected,
55
 international trade impacts, and contribution of 
the measure to the goal.
56
 Possible alternatives to the measure in question must also be 
considered after one has concluded that the measure in question is necessary.
57
  
 
The exception that is included in the GATT and not the GATS, i.e. which applies to 
goods but not to services, (relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources)
58
, requires a relation between the measure in question and the “conservation 
of exhaustible natural resources”. This is a more loosely formulated requirement 
compared to the necessity requirement in article XX b). Also, both the term 
“exhaustible” and “natural resources” must be interpreted in a dynamic, rather than 
static way.
59
 As for the requirement of the measure being “made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption”, “made 
effective” was not meant to require an empirical evidence test, but the measure in 
question has to be primarily aimed at the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources.
60
 Furthermore, the Appellate Body defined “made effective in conjunction 
with” as a “requirement of even-handedness in the imposition of restrictions (…) upon 
the production or consumption of exhaustible natural resources”61. The condition of 
even-handedness does not require the identical treatment of domestic and imported 
products, but more or less equal treatment.  
 
For both of the exception clauses existing under GATT and GATS, the interpretation of 
their content and the extent of their reach must be determined from time to time. The 
necessity requirement for exception b) and the dynamic interpretation of the content of 
g) are indicators of how concrete the determination of the clause’s content is. A 
comparison of these clauses, unrelated to a specific measure, is thus pertinent. On a 
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general level, it is interesting that the exception that may be relevant in cases where 
exhaustible natural resources are to be conserved, only applies to goods. Although not 
as obvious, trade in services might affect natural resources as well, for example in a 
case where only few people possess the knowledge and know-how concerning the use 
of certain natural resources.  
 
In the following I will review how exception clauses have been designed in the other 
trade agreements I have studied, and where applicable, compare these to the GATT and 
GATS exception clauses.  
 
2.2.2 Exception clauses in FTAs 
All but two of the agreements I have studied include general exception clauses.
62
 Many 
bilateral free trade agreements incorporate the GATT/GATS exception provisions in 
part or in their entirety.
63
 Other agreements include exception clauses that include only 
elements of the GATT/GATS clauses. The incorporation of or reference to the 
GATT/GATS exception clauses is done differently in almost all the trade agreements I 
have studied. Also the independently designed clauses vary in design. On a general 
level, the exception clauses differ greatly in both design and scope.  
 
The NAFTA and the China-Peru FTA incorporate GATT article XX and GATS article 
XIV for the purpose of certain of their chapters/parts.
64
 In the case of the China-Peru 
FTA; the GATS article XIV is included for the chapter on trade in services, i.e. 
following the WTO system.
65
 The GATT exception clause, on the other hand, applies to 
goods as well as to sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical barriers to trade, 
hereby expanding the scope of the clause in comparison to the WTO system which 
deals with these issues in separate agreements (the TBT and SPS agreements
66
). In the 
NAFTA, GATT article XX is included for the parts concerning trade in goods, but also 
for technical barriers to trade. I will not speculate on the reason for the inclusion of only 
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parts of the GATT/GATS exception clauses, but merely point out that while referring to 
them, parties choose to incorporate only parts of the clauses, or specify their 
application. As for the case of the China-Peru FTA, the application of the exception 
clause is not a differentiation from the GATT/GATS system, but only specifies the 
application of the clause.  
 
In three instances I found that the parties had included a clause that is exactly the same 
as the GATT article XX, but without reference to the GATT.
67
 One of them, the EFTA-
Singapore FTA, only includes an exception clause for goods, and none for services, 
hereby narrowing the applicability of the exception clauses compared to the GATS. Not 
referring to the GATT/GATS might indicate that the parties wish to stand freely in their 
interpretation of the exception clause, i.e. not to be bound by the WTO Panels or 
Appellate Body interpretations, but I have no other sources than the text itself here and 
cannot conclude on the parties’ intentions.  
 
Other FTAs include exception clauses that have been designed independently of the 
WTO clauses. Of the agreements I have studied, EU-South Korea FTA article 6.1(g), 
and the China-Singapore FTA article 58(2), have a wording that differs from the one 
used in GATT/GATS. The China-Singapore FTA exception clause  states that where 
“urgent problems of safety, health, consumer or environmental protection or national 
security arise or threaten to arise for a Party, that Party may suspend the operation of 
any Annex, in whole or in part, immediately”. The clause hence explicitly includes 
“environmental protection” as one of the exceptions under which the clause may apply. 
“Environmental protection” is not expressively included in the GATT and GATS 
exception clauses, but “environmental protection” has been identified as a legitimate 
object to be considered in evaluating the GATT compatibility with environmental 
regulation.
68
 It is difficult to conclude from the wording alone as to whether the China-
Singapore FTA exception clause is meant to be further-reaching than the GATT/GATS 
exception clauses. Environmental protection seems a legitimate goal in the 
GATT/GATS exception clauses, but how far-reaching be the clause, is impossible to 
ascertain.  
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Based on my studies, exception clauses are common in trade agreements. Most of these 
are closely related to the GATT/GATS system of exception clauses, but their design, 
and to a certain extent their scope, varies. In a Sino-Norwegian context, a general 
exception clause will most likely be included. The least environmentally beneficial 
solution, I presume, is where the parties chose a solution close to the EFTA-Singapore 
FTA, where the exception clause only applies to goods. The most beneficial solution, 
environmentally speaking, will be an exception clause that includes goods, services, 
technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and that also 
explicitly mentions “environmental protection”. It is difficult to conclude on whether 
such a clause could be included in a Sino-Norwegian FTA, since both Norway and 
China are parties to some agreements that include such a reference and others that are 
not. 
 
 
2.3 Subsidies 
Subsidies constitute an important part of international trade concerns. Free trade can 
have unforeseen and grave consequences if subsidies are not regulated. The complex 
and lengthy negotiations on subsidies, mainly agricultural subsidies, was a major reason 
why the WTO Doha round of negotiations ran into a deadlock.  
 
In the following I will briefly introduce the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures Agreement, (SCM), which disciplines the use of subsidies and regulates the 
actions countries can take to counter the effects of subsidies. Because services are not, 
on a general basis, subject to customs in the same way that goods are, the SCM is most 
relevant for traded goods. There is no similar WTO framework for subsidies on 
services. The trade agreements I have studied follow the WTO framework to a large 
extent, and mainly deal with subsidies relating to goods. One major topic concerning 
subsidies is the agricultural subsidies. They are treated in a separate agreement in the 
WTO framework. I will not deal with this topic here, as it is of little relevance in the 
 24 
context of a Sino-Norwegian FTA since the two countries trade mostly in non-
agricultural goods.
69
  
 
In the following I will only deal with the SCM agreement and subsidies regulations in 
trade agreements that relate to goods. I will first introduce the WTO framework, before 
I discuss the corresponding regulations in the trade agreements I have studied.  
 
2.3.1 The WTO framework 
Subsidies usually serve four different purposes, of which three are closely related to 
environmental concerns: economic and industrial development, research and innovation 
and environmental protection.
70
 If countries are allowed to freely subsidise their 
companies or industries, the effects of (free) trade are distorted, and might even have 
very dramatic consequences. The WTO agreements therefore have several regulations 
of subsidies, amongst those the SCM. I will briefly give an overview of the WTO 
subsidy regulations, before I outline the relevant questions concerning subsidies in the 
context of the other trade agreements I have studied.  
 
It is worth noting that the SCM agreement is believed to be the WTO agreement that 
members violate the most, and that subsidies, agricultural in particular, have been one 
of the issues that WTO members have disagreed on the most, and that has caused 
deadlocks in WTO negotiations.
71
 Hence, if one wishes to regulate subsidies in bilateral 
trade agreements, one of the main objectives may be to make the provisions more 
effective than they are in the WTO. I will discuss this in more detail in Section 2.3.2 on 
subsidies regulations in FTAs.  
 
The WTO definition of a subsidy consists of three elements; “(i) a financial contribution 
(ii) by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member (iii) which 
confers a benefit”72. All three conditions must be fulfilled in order for the measure to be 
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defined as a subsidy in the context of the SCM. The SCM further divides subsidies into 
two sub-categories: prohibited
73
 and actionable
74
 subsidies. Prohibited subsidies are, of 
course, prohibited, while actionable subsidies are subsidies against which the party 
adversely affected may call for dispute settlement or enforce countervailing measures. 
Permitting prohibited subsidies in a bilateral FTA is not likely to happen as it will not 
serve the parties’ interests and most likely cause them to breach their WTO obligations. 
As for actionable subsidies, there might be room for these to be regulated differently 
from the SCM, for example by omitting the possibility of countervailing measures, for 
the purpose of allowing subsidies for environmental projects.  
 
The actionable subsidies are, as mentioned above, not prohibited, but can be challenged 
by other WTO members. To be actionable, a subsidy must target a specific producer, or 
group of producers. If it is not specific, it is automatically permissible. If a subsidy is 
specific, it must adversely affect the interests of another member in order to be 
challenged successfully. If these conditions are met, the member state which applied the 
subsidy shall take appropriate measures to remove the adverse effect or withdraw the 
subsidy. If this is not done, the member state affected has the right to commence 
countermeasures.  
 
Until December the 31
st
 of 1999, there was also a category of subsidies called non-
actionable.
75
 These included, amongst others, assistance to promote adaptation to new 
environmental requirements and assistance for research activities.
76
 The non-actionable 
subsidies were narrowly defined, and were permitted under the WTO regime. The 
article on non-actionable subsidies lapsed as the consensus needed to extend it was not 
reached. The argument of those countries that declined the renewal of article 8 was that 
they wanted a much more flexible approach, allowing for other objectives than those in 
the now expired article 8 to receive equally special treatment.
77
 Although the article 
officially expired in 2000, subsidies that were defined as non-actionable are still 
applied, without member states fearing that they will be challenged in the WTO 
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system.
78
 Hence, it remains unclear whether two WTO member states bilaterally can 
agree upon regulations similar to the lapsed article 8 of the SCM without breaching 
their WTO obligations. The general rule still remains that subsidies are not permitted. 
Including a regulation similar to the lapsed article 8 would provide an exception from 
this. A party to the agreement could then subsidise, for example, research facilities 
without the other party having a right to introduce countervailing measures. Another 
way of solving the problem of not having an article 8 regulation is to bilaterally agree 
upon applying countervailing measures for actionable subsidies subsequent to article 5 
in the case of subsidies for environmental purposes. Imposing countervailing measures 
is a right, not an obligation, of the member states, and this right could therefore possibly 
be omitted, for example, in a bilateral trade agreement. 
 
2.3.2 Subsidies regulations in FTAs 
In all but two of the FTAs I have studied,
79
 there is reference to the SCM agreement 
regarding subsidies. The EU-Mexico and EU-Chile FTAs include no reference to the 
SCM agreement, or to other regulation of subsidies. However, all the EU member states 
are members of the WTO in their own right, and so are Chile and Mexico. They are 
therefore governed by the WTO rules, and the SCM agreement will in any case apply to 
them. As mentioned earlier, these two FTAs are considered obsolete in terms of 
environmental regulation. Whether or not this also applies to the topic of subsidies, I 
have not been able to confirm. The more recent EU-South Korea FTA, on the other 
hand, does include reference to the SCM.  
 
In all the Chinese FTAs I have studied there is direct reference to the SCM stating that 
the parties maintain their rights and obligations under the SCM.
80
 Most of the EFTA 
FTAs also contain similar provisions stating that the rights and obligations of the parties 
shall be governed by SCM.
81
 There is, however, one exception: the EFTA-Hong Kong 
FTA includes regulations of subsidies that differ from the above.  
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The EFTA-Hong Kong FTA has a different approach to countervailing measures. The 
EFTA-Hong Kong FTA states that “Hong Kong, China and Norway shall not apply 
countervailing measures as provided for under (…) the “SCM Agreement” in relation to 
products originating in a Party referred to in this paragraph”82. The parties have 
resigned from their right pursuant to the SCM to apply countervailing measures against 
each other. This means that actionable subsidies, as defined in the SCM article 5, give 
no right to the other party to apply countervailing measures. Norway or Hong Kong 
may therefore make use of actionable subsidies (by the SCM definition) for purposes 
of, for example, environmental protection, and cannot be subjected to countervailing 
measures from the other party. Their remaining rights pursuant to article 7, i.e. request 
for consultations, remain unchanged.
83
 The other EFTA states that are parties to the 
EFTA-Hong Kong FTA are governed by the SCM agreement. The FTA makes an 
exception from the SCM procedures, however, concerning the conditions under which a 
party may commence an investigation upon suspicion of the other party’s breach of the 
subsidies’ regulations.84  
 
All the agreements to which Norway or China are party, which I have studied, include 
reference to the WTO subsidies regulations. Including such a reference is thus also 
viable in a Sino-Norwegian FTA. Furthermore, Norway has already committed itself to 
an agreement which provides for the possibility to subsidise environmental protection 
without the fear of countermeasures. Such a solution could be considered in the Sino-
Norwegian FTA, but the viability of this is difficult to assess. 
 
 
 
3 Mitigating environmental challenges due to free trade 
The concern for possible negative impacts from trade on the environment is explored 
through established theories and a series of proposed and existing regulations to 
mitigate possible negative effects. In the following I will introduce the most established 
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theories, the criticism against them, and attempts to mitigate negative impacts in the 
agreements I have studied.  
 
As for mitigation possibilities in the agreement between Norway and China, political 
consideration is also important in assessing realistic mitigation options. Although 
Norway is becoming an important trading partner for China, it is far from being one of 
the largest. It is therefore unlikely that an agreement between the two parties will lead 
China to alter its domestic environmental legislation. During the negotiations between 
Norway and China, environmental issues, along with other flanking issues, have not yet 
been extensively discussed. Preliminary talks on environmental issues have uncovered 
China’s reluctant attitude towards including extensive regulation of environmental 
issues in the FTA. The new EFTA approach, as expressed in the EFTA model 
agreement, was presented to the Chinese negotiators. They seemed reluctant and 
expressed scepticism towards this approach, and currently the Chinese reply to this 
suggestion is pending.
85
 As negotiations are not finalised, the parties’ final attitude 
towards including environmental regulation cannot be determined.  
 
In the following I will first give an overview of the most established theories on the 
negative impacts on the environment from trade, before I study mitigation possibilities. 
I have chosen to categorize the mitigation possibilities according to what I have found 
in the agreements I have studied: harmonisation clauses, enforcement agreements and 
not-lowering-standards clauses. This categorization is not meant to be all-
encompassing, but to serve as a tool for analysing mitigation possibilities.  
 
3.1 The “race to the bottom” and “regulatory chill” 
There is no one official definition of the “race to the bottom”, although the theory is 
well-established in international trade politics. One common definition describes the 
theory as follows: in the competition between nations over a particular area of trade or 
production, countries have increased incentive to dismantle currently existing 
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regulatory standards.
86
 In other words, a free trade scenario will result in lower 
environmental standards in order to attract business.  
 
The “regulatory chill” theory is not as well-established in the international debate on 
trade and environment. A definition provided by Eric Neumayer is that with free trade, 
the fear of capital loss might induce countries not to raise environmental standards.
87
 
The consequences of a regulatory chill are perhaps not as grave as those resulting from 
a race to the bottom, but in the long term they might have equally negative 
consequences for the environment.  
 
I have chosen to introduce these theories together because much of the literature written 
on the topics applies to them both. Also, mitigation possibilities are in some cases equal 
or similar. I will return to mitigation possibilities in Section 3.3. My aim here is to 
examine the extent and validity of these theories, based on reports on the topic as well 
as general information on the development of environmental regulation in China and 
Norway. 
 
I will in the following use the NAFTA for general background information, because of 
the detail of the analysis, in combination with empirical evidence. Also, I will focus on 
China’s and Norway’s environmental development in order to attempt a forecast of the 
development in a Sino-Norwegian free trade scenario.  
 
There is little evidence of competitive lowering of standards, or a race to the bottom, to 
attract investment or encourage trade.
88
 Contrary to the theory of a race to the bottom, 
there exists empirical data that suggests a positive link between environmental quality 
and openness of trade.
89
 This is explained by a spur in technological innovation due to 
competition from the outside, import of new technologies and a rise in public 
awareness. One can argue that in the case of China, this seems to hold true. Both 
imports to and exports from China have steadily become cleaner over the past 
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decades.
90
 Cleaner production techniques are suggested to have been the most important 
contributor to this trend. Identifying a causal relationship between agreements and 
development in the environmental sector is difficult. However, it seems that although a 
race to the bottom could have been expected in the case of China, its impacts have not 
been of any significance to the general environmental development of the country.  
 
As for possible race to the bottom consequences of NAFTA, one has found no evidence 
supporting the hypothesis for the US.
91
 As for the Sino-Norwegian context, one area in 
which the competition between Norway and China is an issue, is CO2 quota regulation. 
Norwegian businesses have over the past years argued that strict CO2 regulation will 
lead Norwegian industries to move to countries with more lax CO2 regulation, such as 
China. This has led Norwegian authorities to grant certain exceptions from the CO2 
regulations
92
, constituting a possible race to the bottom. China, however, poses an 
entirely different problem. Here, the challenge is not so much that China might initiate 
more pollution through production, but rather that they will not be willing to commit to 
standards requiring less pollution, i.e. a regulatory chill. The CEC assessment
93
 
emphasises the need for offsetting policy interventions to reduce the risk of a race to the 
bottom.  
 
In general though, empirical evidence is hard to come by in order to confirm or 
disprove the theory of a race to the bottom. Mitigation possibilities, often aimed at 
dealing with several of the possible negative consequences on the environment due to 
trade, are already outlined in several trade agreements. I will not write off the validity of 
the theory, or confirm it, but rather analyse more closely the already existing mitigation 
mechanisms in the agreements I have studied, which I will return to in Section 3. 
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The regulatory chill effect, on the other hand, has been found to take place to a certain 
extent.
94
 Unfortunately, I have found no literature on this topic written since 2001.
95
 
Assuming that the fear of a regulatory chill effect might be relevant for China and 
Norway, as well as the fact that mitigation possibilities already are outlined in several 
trade agreements, further analysis of this theory and mitigation possibilities are of 
interest in the context of this thesis.  
 
 
3.2  Pollution havens  
The pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) predicts that, under free trade, multinational 
firms will relocate the production of their pollution-intensive goods to developing 
countries, taking advantage of the low monitoring and enforcement of the 
environmental laws and regulations in these countries.
96
 The theory is disputed, and 
empirical evidence of the phenomenon is evasive.
97
 However, the PHH has recently 
been found to hold true, but not so much for entire countries as for certain sectors and 
industries.
98
 But there is also another important issue to address; the convenience of 
moving businesses and production depends on several factors, including geographical 
situation, labour cost and environmental standards. In the case of Norway and China, 
the two countries are so far apart geographically, that business movement from one 
country to the other is such a major decision for most businesses that it will require a 
substantial difference in environmental legislation, in addition to other factors such as 
labour costs, to motivate such a move.  
 
A lack of evidence, or uncertainty regarding whether the hypothesis holds true for the 
Sino-Norwegian relationship, does not imply that it is impossible that such an effect 
does exist, in some form or another. The fact that some of the FTAs I have studied 
include provisions that seem to aim at mitigating the consequences of the pollution 
haven phenomenon makes it relevant for this thesis. The mitigation possibilities for the 
                                                 
94
 Nordstrom, Hakan and Vaughan, Scott, 1999, page 45 
95
 Email correspondence with Neumayer, Eric, LSE 
96
 Temurshoev, Umed, 2006, page 2 
97
 Neumayer, Eric, 2001, page 149 and Temurshoev, Umed, 2006, page 3 
98
 OECD: Environment and Regional Trade Agreements, 2007 
 32 
PHH span wider than for the consequences of a race to the bottom or regulatory chill 
because so many other factors influence the business movement, such as labour costs 
and the proximity to the relevant market. In the following, I will briefly introduce 
mitigation possibilities and link these to relevant provisions in the FTAs I have studied.  
 
 
3.3 Mitigation possibilities 
The evidence supporting the three theories presented above is not extensive. 
Nevertheless, quite a few FTAs include provisions that are meant to mitigate the effects 
of a race to the bottom, regulatory chill or pollution haven situation. Although it is 
difficult to conclude on the effectiveness of these measures, mainly due to the lack of 
empirical evidence, they might help clarify the parties’ intentions and good will to 
sustain or raise environmental standards in general. In this section I will introduce 
provisions that aim at mitigating the possible negative impacts on the environment from 
trade, provisions that are assumed to counter the three theories discussed above. I will 
then apply this to the Sino-Norwegian context. 
 
3.3.1 Harmonisation of environmental standards and commitment to 
international environmental agreements 
Provisions aiming at harmonizing environmental standards typically appear in trade 
agreements that aim at creating an integrated free trade region.
99
 Harmonisation of 
environmental standards is an ambitious goal, even more so when the parties to an 
agreement are far apart geographically and are different in terms of previous 
environmental regulation. Harmonisation of environmental standards can, from a 
theoretical point of view, mitigate challenges due both a race-to-the-bottom and a 
pollution haven effect by ensuring that it constitutes a breach of the agreement to lower 
standards, and hence that no lower environmental standards will attract businesses to 
move. There do exist provisions in trade agreements that aim at harmonisation. In this 
part I will in look into two aspects of harmonisation; the provisions that regulate the 
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relationship between the FTA and international environmental standards, and the 
harmonisation provisions in the trade agreement between the parties themselves.  
 
One concern that has been brought forward in the debate on trade and the environment 
is that when two countries of which one is not a member to as many international 
environmental agreements as the other, sign a trade agreement, the incentives for the 
first country to join the international environmental agreements is smaller because it 
will see no benefit in raising their environmental standards when they have already 
secured much of their trade through a free trade agreement. In other words, there is a 
fear that free trade agreements will create fear of commitment to international 
environmental agreements if this results in a disadvantage compared to the other 
country. This is one issue that can be resolved through the regulation of harmonisation, 
and is a reason why there have been attempts at resolving this in several free trade 
agreements. 
 
The commitment to international environmental protocols by parties to trade 
agreements varies greatly. In most of the agreements I have studied, there is only a 
general reference to the relationship to international agreements, and few specifically to 
environmental agreements or protocols. Many of the Chinese FTAs establish 
committees on sanitary and phytosanitary matters that are intended to provide a 
platform for consulting on issues such as food safety and human, animal and plant 
health. The committee’s responsibilities include discussing issues under certain 
conventions that are referred to, such as the International Plant Protection 
Convention.
100
 But neither environmental issues in general nor sustainable development 
are usually referred to.  
 
The EFTA FTAs similarly have few references to international environmental 
agreements. One exception is the EFTA-Hong Kong FTA, (see Annex 4, 
Harmonisation), which in its chapter 8 on the environment includes a provision on the 
parties’ commitment to effectively implement the Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment of 1972, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992, 
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Agenda 21 on Environment and Development of 1992, and the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation on Sustainable Development of 2002.
101
 These declarations are all UN 
declarations, and both Norway and China are parties to these declarations. As such, the 
provision does not alter the legal status quo between the two countries if they were to 
include a provision similar to the one in the EFTA-Hong Kong FTA, but it could be 
important to underline the intentions of the parties. The EFTA model agreement 
contains a clause aimed at reaffirming the parties’ obligations to international 
agreements on the environment,
102
 similar to the EFTA-Hong Kong FTA provision. The 
model includes no other provisions aimed at the harmonisation of standards or rules 
between the parties. 
 
The only provision I have found that has a reference to harmonising two countries’ 
legislation directly (i.e. not a commitment to an international agreement or protocol), is 
in the EU-Mexico FTA. It states that the parties “shall examine (…) measures to 
harmonize health, plant-health and environmental standards and rules”. The clause only 
applies to the areas of agricultural, agro-industrial and rural sectors.  I have not found 
any information concerning whether this clause has resulted in any harmonisation. In 
more recent agreements, such as the EU-South Korea FTA, such provisions are not 
included. In fact, the EU-South Korea FTA includes a general provision that explicitly 
states that the parties do not aim to harmonise their environmental standards.
103
 I will 
not speculate further on the reasons for including this exceptional clause.  
 
In general harmonisation clauses are rarely included in trade agreements. The Chinese 
FTAs I have studied do not include any general harmonisation clauses. Only one EFTA 
FTA includes a harmonisation clause, formulated as a commitment to international 
instruments.
104
 I have not found any reference as to why harmonisation clauses are 
uncommom, but the fact that they are uncommon might in itself make it more difficult 
to implement such provisions in a Sino-Norwegian FTA.  
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3.3.2  Enforcement agreements  
Enforcement agreements, or enforcement provisions or clauses, are created to ensure 
that the parties to a trade agreement enforce the domestic laws on related issues. This is 
to prevent unforeseeable future discrepancies between the parties to the trade 
agreement.  
 
Enforcement agreements deal with the challenges of a possible race-to-the-bottom 
scenario by ensuring that existing laws are enforced. However, they do not mitigate a 
possible regulatory chill, or even a lowering of environmental standards. Enforcement 
agreements therefore have to be used in combination with other mitigation possibilities 
in order to ensure a maintained or increased level of environmental law and standards. 
 
A key element of the Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH) is that monitoring in one 
business sector or area might be less stringent than in a similar section or area of the 
other party to a trade agreement. Neumayer evaluates enforcement agreements quite 
positively as a means of mitigating PHH.
105
 He shows that such agreements are 
effective, because they will ensure that laws concerning environmental monitoring are 
enforced. However, he also points to the fact that enforcement agreements might be 
politically unrealistic, because they deal with domestic law enforcement. This point is 
particularly relevant due to China’s well-known non-interference policy106. 
 
In the following I will study more closely the content of the enforcement provisions I 
have found in the agreements I have studied, with special attention to the question of 
whether such clauses are politically realistic. I will first discuss the three enforcement 
provisions in the NAAEC, EFTA-Hong Kong FTA and the EU-South Korea FTA. I 
will then briefly deal with at the China-New Zealand environmental side agreement, as 
it includes a reference to the objective of enforcing, but with different wording than the 
other enforcement provisions.  
 
Article 5(1) of NAAEC states that “each Party shall effectively enforce its 
environmental laws and regulations through appropriate governmental action”. The 
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clause also proposes relevant governmental action, requires enforcement proceedings 
and defines what sanctions and remedies are appropriate. The interpretation of article 
5(1) is further outlined in article 45, defining what is not a failure to effectively enforce 
an environmental law. The NAAEC also includes a “not lowering standards” clause, 
which ensures that possible consequences of a race-to-the-bottom are also mitigated. I 
will return to this in Section 3.3.3. Article 14 of the NAAEC ensures that any 
stakeholder (non-governmental organisation or person) can file a submission asserting 
that a party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental laws. One CEC paper 
points to the fact that only about 80 submissions have been filed since 1994. It is 
therefore difficult to conclude on the effectiveness of the NAAEC enforcement 
measures.
107
  
 
I will not go into detail on any of these issues, as the objective here is merely to show 
that enforcement clauses, also including public participation, can, in certain instances, 
be politically realistic. One of the limitations that might have made the enforcement 
clause possible is article 37, which by reference from article 5(1) ensures that the article 
is read with the specification that nothing in the article shall be construed as allowing a 
party to undertake environmental law enforcement in the other parties’ territories. This 
stipulation might have made the enforcement clause politically viable in the case of the 
NAFTA, ensuring that no one party would gain jurisdiction beyond what was 
considered to be desired by any of the parties to the treaty. In conclusion, the 
enforcement articles of the NAAEC ensure the prevention of a possible pollution haven, 
but do not deal with the challenges of a possible race to the bottom or regulatory chill. 
These challenges are mitigated though a separate article, which I will analyse further in 
Section 3.3.3.  
 
The EFTA-Hong Kong FTA article 8.4 states that the “parties will faithfully enforce 
their environmental laws, regulations and standards”. It does not, as article 5(1) of the 
NAAEC, define what government actions are required. It is not an extensive article, and 
it remains to be seen whether it is effective or not. On the other hand, article 8.4, similar 
to those of the NAAEC, includes a prohibition to weaken or reduce the level of 
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environmental protection provided by that party’s laws, thus dealing with the 
consequences of a race to the bottom scenario at the same time as it stipulates 
monitoring (where this is part of a party’s existing environmental laws). I will return to 
this part of the article when I deal with the issue of not lowering standards in Section 
3.3.3. The enforcement clause in the EFTA-Hong Kong FTA is almost identical to the 
enforcement clause proposed in the EFTA model provisions.
108
 This clearly indicates 
that it is politically realistic to include such provisions in future FTAs. However, the 
political viability might be limited to the EFTA states. China rejected the Norwegian 
proposal which was similar to the EFTA model, but we do not know whether this was 
due to the enforcement clause. The enforcement clause does interfere with domestic 
regulation and domestic enforcement, and might be contrary to the Chinese line of non-
interference, and therefore less realistic in the case of a Sino-Norwegian FTA. 
 
The EU-South Korea FTA includes an enforcement reference, in article 6.1(g) of the 
agreement. The article states that the parties will carry out their obligations under the 
agreement according to the following principle: “measures to facilitate trade shall not 
prejudice the fulfilment of legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of 
national security, health and the environment”. What “legitimate policy objectives” are 
in the context of the agreement and what is defined as “protection of the environment”, 
is not clarified in the agreement. The reference to enforcement is categorized under the 
headline “Objectives and Principles”. It clarifies the parties’ understanding of the 
importance of implementation, but it is not an enforceable provision in itself. In this 
regard, it is similar to the references to the environment found in various preambles to 
FTAs, used as a means of interpretation, rather than a clause that can be invoked 
directly by any party. This kind of enforcement provision is clearly realistic politically, 
as it does not obligate the parties in any specific way. The benefits of such a clause 
might be smaller than those of the EFTA-Hong Kong FTA. However, as the EU-South 
Korea FTA has only been in force since 2011, there is no conclusive evidence as to its 
effects.  
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Lastly, the China-New Zealand Environmental Cooperation Agreement includes 
references to the enforcement of environmental laws, but with a different aim: to ensure 
that each party is free to enforce their own environmental laws. Article 1 of the 
agreement states: “The Parties respect the sovereign rights of each country to set its 
own policies and national priorities and to set, administer and enforce its own 
environmental laws and regulations”. In the next section of the article, the parties 
emphasize that they recognize the goal of reaching sustainable development and that 
they must act accordingly. The agreement does not, however, include any obligation to 
enforce existing environmental laws.  
 
I have not found any enforcement provisions in any of the other Chinese FTAs. 
Including a clause similar to the one in the China-Singapore FTA is clearly politically 
realistic as it already exists, but it does not serve the purpose of ensuring domestic law 
enforcement. As noted above, including an enforcement clause as stringent as the one in 
the NAAEC or the EFTA-Hong Kong FTA is probably politically unrealistic in a Sino-
Norwegian FTA. A less stringently designed clause, such as the one in the EU-South 
Korea FTA might be possible.  
 
3.3.3 Not lowering standards  
One way of mitigating a race to the bottom or regulatory chill effect is by including a 
statement on development of national legislation in a clause that is typically found in 
bilateral trade agreements; the “right to regulate and levels of protection” clause.109 In 
the agreements I have studied this is mostly included as a clause that reaffirms the right 
of each party to set their own environmental standards (within the framework of their 
international obligations), though recognizing at the same time that the purpose of 
environmental regulation is to achieve sustainable development. Such an environmental 
obligation is too vague to be enforced; it can mostly be categorized as an objective. 
Nonetheless, it does emphasize the parties’ intentions concerning the development of 
their legislation in accordance with environmental principles, and can be relevant when 
interpreting the meaning of other provisions of the agreement. 
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Another way of preventing a race to the bottom or the creation of pollution havens is to 
include a prohibition of lowering standards aimed at attracting business. None of the 
Chinese FTAs I have dealt with include such a clause. Only the EU-South Korea and 
the EFTA-Hong Kong FTAs refer to “not lowering standards”. The EU-South Korea 
FTA defines the obligation as an objective for the agreement, though not a binding 
clause.
110
 The EFTA-Hong Kong FTA states that the parties must faithfully enforce 
their laws, and not weaken or reduce their level of environmental protection in order to 
encourage investment from the other party.
111
 This type of legally binding clause is 
more often found in investment agreements, where they can be formulated more 
specifically. I will not go into further detail on investment agreements or clauses on 
investment. 
 
The use of enforcement agreements or clauses, as discussed above, only ensures that 
existing environmental standards are met. They do not prevent any party from lowering 
their environmental standards. The obligation of an enforcement clause will be close to 
void if the standards are so low that in reality there is nothing to enforce. Through so-
called “not lowering standards” clauses, parties to trade agreements have approached 
this issue. It is easy to conclude that enforcement clauses and “not lowering standards 
clauses” are substantially more efficient when they are used in combination. In the 
following I will evaluate the relationship between these two types of clauses to see 
whether these clauses are used mostly in combination.  
 
“Not lowering standards” clauses mainly deal with the fears of a race to the bottom, by 
preventing any movement towards the “bottom” of environmental regulation. However, 
in combination with enforcement clauses,” not lowering standards” clauses can also 
prevent a PHH effect, (see the discussion above on enforcement agreements). 
Depending on the wording of a “not lowering standards” clause, it may also have a 
positive effect on regulation so as to prevent a regulatory chill, though in isolation, “not 
lowering standards” clauses do little to mitigate this problem. In the following I will 
give an overview of the design and content of the “not lowering standards” clauses I 
have found in the agreements I have studied.  
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The NAAEC includes both an enforcement provision (see above) and a “not lowering 
standards” provision. They are both listed under the part of the agreement called 
“Obligations”, indicating that they represent not just an objective but enforceable 
obligations for all parties. The “not lowering standards” clause, article 3 of the NAAEC, 
states that “each party shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high levels 
of environmental protection and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and 
regulations”. There is no specific prohibition of the lowering of standards, but the 
article is clearly aimed at not only maintaining a certain level of environmental 
standards, but also improving it. This clause hereby also limits any possible regulatory 
chill effect, by specifically addressing the obligation to strive to improve environmental 
laws and regulations.  
 
Similar to the NAAEC, the EFTA-Hong Kong FTA includes both an enforcement 
provision and a “not lowering standards” provision. The “not lowering standards” 
provision is quite similar to the NAAEC provision, and states that the parties shall seek 
to “provide for and encourage high levels of environmental protection (…), and will 
strive to further improve the level of protection provided for in domestic law and 
policies”112. The article is found in the trade and environment chapter of the agreement, 
as is the enforcement clause. The EFTA model agreement also includes a “not lowering 
standards” clause.113 This model clause differs in content from the EFTA-Hong Kong 
FTA clause, as it states that a party shall not weaken its environmental regulation for 
the sole intention of attracting investment from the other party. This means that there is 
no absolute prohibition against lowering environmental standards, only to the extent 
that it is intended to attract business. This specifically targets the possibility of pollution 
havens, and limits the possibility of a race-to-the-bottom only within this specific area 
of regulation. From a dispute settlement perspective it would be extremely difficult to 
prove the intention of the other party (to attract investment), and the clause would 
therefore probably not be enforceable. As in the case of many of the environmental 
provisions, this clause is not in itself enforceable, but might in the same way as a 
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preamble clarify the parties’ intentions, and in the case of conflict become helpful for 
interpretation purposes.  
 
The last of the agreements I have studied that include both an enforcement provision 
and a “not lowering standards” provision is the EU-Korea FTA. However, the “not 
lowering standards” provision is found under the “Objectives” part of the agreement, 
and is not formulated as an enforceable provision. Article 1.1(h) states that one of the 
objectives of the agreement is “to promote foreign direct investment without lowering 
or reducing environmental (…) standards”. As mentioned above, this article might, 
although not enforceable, provide information useful for the interpretation of other 
articles to the agreement. Also, the clause is not general in wording, but applies only for 
the case of attracting investment, thus limiting its importance (see discussion above for 
the same question concerning the EFTA model provision).  
 
In the selection of agreements I have studied, the “not lowering standards” clause is not 
universally employed. However, in the agreement that has the most extensive 
environmental regulation, the NAAEC, and two of the more recent agreements, the 
EFTA-Hong Kong FTA and the EU-South Korea FTA, the clause is found, in all cases 
in combination with an enforcement provision. None of the Chinese FTAs include an 
obligation to not lower standards. My empirical research is not extensive enough to 
legitimize any broad conclusions, but from my findings it does seem that the more 
extensive an environmental side agreement is or the more focus there is on 
environmental issues in the FTA itself, the more likely one is to find a “not lowering 
standards” provision, and also an enforcement provision.  
 
A special concern in the case of China is their Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Since 
the opening of the Chinese economy in the 80’s, these zones have been accorded special 
benefits in order to attract foreign investment. The fear of relaxed environmental 
regulation in these areas has proven to be unfounded. Chinese authorities have 
strengthened environmental controls in SEZs in recent years. This is partly because of 
they wish to regain political control in the areas, but also because the authorities believe 
that increased environmental control facilitates the reception of foreign businesses and 
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hereby assists in China’s modernisation.114 However, none of the Chinese FTAs I have 
studied include a “not lowering standards” clause, which might indicate that they still 
wish to be free to regulate environmental standards differently in the SEZs. Instead of 
mitigating a possible race to the bottom through a “not lowering standards” clause, one 
might design special environmental development zones. I will return to this possibility 
in Section 4.3. 
 
When studying the case of Norway and China, it is important to note that Norway is 
already party to an agreement that obligates them to high environmental standards in 
general (the EFTA-Hong Kong FTA, see above). Although enforcement concerns might 
have an impact on Norway’s willingness to commit itself similarly in an agreement with 
China, there is nothing in principle that should prohibit them from agreeing to a similar 
enforcement and” not lowering standards” mechanism, as they already have this 
commitment in another agreement. As for China, they are, except for the case of Hong 
Kong, as far as I know, not party to any trade agreement which includes “not lowering 
standards” or enforcement provisions. Accordingly, it is unlikely that China will take 
the lead on this matter in Sino-Norwegian trade negotiations. However, it is primarily a 
political question whether the inclusion of such clauses in a Sino-Norwegian FTA is 
realistic or not.  
 
4  Enhancing positive effects of trade on the environment 
The link between trade and the environment has been debated heavily. I have 
mentioned some of the discussions concerning the link between the two. In this section 
I will focus only on the positive effects of trade on the environment. In this introduction 
I will briefly explain the “push and pull” effect theory as a background for the following 
discussions on how to enhance the positive effects of trade on the environment. 
 
The “push and pull” effect has been debated and studied mainly in the case of the 
NAAEC. The potential push and pull effects are the largest here, because the NAFTA 
has created the largest free trade area in the world, and also has a substantial side 
agreement on the environment. Also, the free trade area is a geographically integrated 
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region, which means that the trade between the parties is substantial and with a great 
potential of mutual influence. A bilateral trade agreement between two parties that are 
as far apart geographically as China and Norway is unlikely to have impacts on a scale 
similar to that of the NAFTA countries. Nonetheless, the “push and pull” theory, and 
the studies of it, show interesting findings that can be useful in the discussion of how 
one can use trade provisions to enhance positive effects on the environment.  
 
Evidence from the CEC has shown that that both the “push” effect of regulatory 
influence and the “pull” effect of market pressures have influenced the “greening” of 
the Mexican Industry.
115
 The analysis shows that the market forces were significantly 
more important than the regulatory influence. This constitutes a positive effect on the 
environment due to trade, allowing market forces based on consumers’ preferences to 
influence industrial development choices. It is important to emphasise, though, that this 
study only dealt with the industrial sector of Mexico, and focused, naturally, on export-
oriented industry. Other parts of the economy and industries producing for domestic 
consumption were not analysed. From a theoretical point of view, it is unlikely that 
production for domestic consumption will show the same results. One could assume 
though, that over time, consumer preferences in Mexico will change and become 
similar to those in the US. In the following I will discuss different mechanisms for 
enhancing the positive influence from trade on the environment, including 
environmental side agreements, ecolabels and environmental development zones.  
 
 
4.1 Environmental side agreements 
Some of the trade agreements I have studied have attached separate environmental side 
agreements. The NAFTA is the agreement that has the most elaborate environmental 
side agreement (the NAAEC), but also the China-New Zealand FTA and the China-
Chile FTA have separate environmental cooperation agreements. In this section I will 
not deal with the provisions in the environmental side agreements as such, but focus on 
the environmental cooperation these agreements cover.  
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The fact that the trade agreements include reference to the side agreements becomes 
relevant when interpreting the trade agreements as such.
116
 Environmental concerns can 
thus be given more influence in the interpretation of other provisions in the trade 
agreement. More importantly though, the environmental side agreements create 
opportunities for better environmental cooperation, and in the case of NAAEC, rights 
and obligations for their members as well. My sources in this area are limited not only 
because of the small number of environmental side agreements that exist among the 
FTAs I have studied, but also that one of them, the China-Chile Environmental 
Cooperation Agreement is not accessible. Extensive searching and inquiries have, 
unfortunately, not provided any results. In the following I am therefore limited to 
analysing the China-New Zealand environmental cooperation agreement and the 
NAAEC.  
 
The NAAEC is regarded as an extensive, perhaps the most extensive, regulation of 
environmental matters in conjunction with a trade agreement. Many of its provisions 
have already been discussed above, and I will also return to its provisions on dispute 
settlement later. In this section I will focus on the provisions that concern the 
cooperation between the parties to the agreement. However, I will not go into detail on 
the regulations themselves, as a detailed study is anyway not necessary for the general 
analysis I will undertake here. The NAAEC consists of seven parts of which two relate 
specifically to environmental cooperation. Part three regards the Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation, and part four the Cooperation and Provision of 
Information. In short, the chapters provide detailed regulations on how the Commission, 
comprising the council, a secretariat and a joint public advisory committee shall work. 
The various sections of the Commission are regulated in detail through the NAAEC, 
and their tasks range from providing an appropriate forum for discussion of 
environmental issues and adopting resolutions on a wide variety of specifically defined 
matters, to writing reports and considering submissions from the public on national 
enforcement matters. These mechanisms can, although not directly, enhance the push 
and pull effects through including a range of cooperation within the Commission and 
also allowing for public participation. 
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The regulation of the environmental cooperation in NAAEC is institutionalized to a 
very high degree. Such cooperation requires substantial funds, and hence political will. 
The fact that the three parties to the agreement are very closely linked, especially as 
trading partners,
117
 increases the likelihood of making them willing to invest in such an 
extensive cooperation. This kind of extensive cooperation is more likely in a free trade 
region or area, than it is in a bilateral trade agreement. Such extensive cooperation 
within every bilateral trade agreement would make the international environmental 
cooperation unmanageable.  
 
Assessing whether the NAAEC environmental cooperation has been successful is rather 
difficult. Judging from the CEC website (the NAAEC Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation website), the activity level has declined substantially, and for no apparent 
reason. No annual report has been published since 2006, (that was the report of 
2004).
118
 There are no plans beyond projects to be in 2012 (plans are normally made 
several years in advance),
119
 and the average number of registered citizen submissions 
on enforcement matters has decreased since 2006.
120
 The literature I have found on the 
matter does not cover the past seven years, and does not provide any information 
concerning what the current status quo is. I have not been able to obtain any 
information of newer date. I dare not draw any conclusions as to the reason for the 
apparent decrease in activity. It might be tempting to conclude that the NAAEC is a too 
extensive and expensive form of regulation for a regional free trade area, and would be 
even more so for a bilateral free trade agreement. It is not unlikely, though, that some 
parts of the cooperation have functioned better than others, and if available, this 
information could provide interesting conclusions concerning the feasibility and 
efficiency of environmental cooperation in trade-related terms.  
 
The China-New Zealand environmental cooperation agreement, hereafter called ECA, 
includes a series of proposed areas and measures for environmental cooperation 
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between the two parties. The ECA article 2 states that the parties agree to cooperate on 
environmental matters of mutual interest. It then goes on to suggest the means through 
which such cooperation might take place, including the exchange of relevant 
experience, visits of experts, jointly organized seminars etc. To guarantee the 
implementation of the agreement, article 3 obligates the parties to appoint coordinators 
at a high level to facilitate the communication between the parties. As for the funding of 
the cooperation, it is decided in the agreement that it shall be settled on a case-by-case 
basis. There is no dispute settlement mechanism in the agreement, only a reference in 
article 4 to settle disputes amicably. The agreement is not extensive: only six articles 
long, and contains few enforceable provisions. It is difficult to assume anything on the 
basis of one such agreement. However, in legal terms, this sort of agreement does not 
represent obligations that require a large commitment from the two parties. As 
mentioned earlier though, such an agreement does show the good intentions of the 
parties, and one might argue that the agreement in itself is only a minor example of the 
cooperation that has already been developed between the parties prior to the signing of 
the ECA. In this regard, such an agreement might be more useful than one might think 
because it provides a platform for environmental debate and cooperation that would 
otherwise not have existed, permitting the existing push and pull effects to gain 
increased importance. Also, it seems likely that China is more likely to commit itself to 
this sort of agreement than something similar to the NAAEC, considering their reluctant 
feedback on the Norwegian proposal for more focus on environmental issues. 
 
4.2 Ecolabels  
There exist more than 400 eco-labelling schemes in the world today.
121
 Eco-labels are 
defined by the OECD as voluntary labels which convey information to consumers about 
the environmental implications associated with all elements in the product’s ‘life’, i.e. 
its production, distribution, use and disposal.
122
 Since the first eco-labelling scheme was 
established in the 70s, many new schemes have emerged, despite the fact that the 
evidence of their effect is somewhat inconclusive. 
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In the following I will briefly introduce eco-labelling as a concept before elaborating on 
a couple of examples that may shed light on the possibility of including such a 
mechanism in the Sino-Norwegian FTA. 
 
Private voluntary labelling schemes are not governed directly by WTO rules. If they are 
developed with assistance from the government, this potentially creates a legal link 
between the government and the scheme for which WTO rules may apply directly. This 
might be the case regarding the Nordic Swan programme, which was supported by the 
Norwegian government. The Chinese Huan eco-labelling programme launched by the 
Chinese Environmental Protection Administration may also be governed by WTO rules. 
Where labelling requires information about the way in which a good is produced, this 
may be seen as discrimination according to WTO rules and thus be in conflict with the 
countries’ obligations.123 An eco-labelling scheme might be in accordance with WTO 
rules, and if not may be permitted under the exception clauses. As far as I have been 
able to establish, no disputes concerning eco-labelling have hitherto been brought 
before the WTO, and there has only been one GATT case where eco-labelling was 
considered (the Tuna-Dolphin I case). The essentially voluntary US labelling scheme 
was found to be GATT-consistent as it did not restrict the sale of tuna in the US, and 
was consistent with the most favoured nation obligation.
124
 The question of whether 
such a scheme might be permitted under the exception clauses has therefore never been 
discussed. 
 
None of the FTAs that I have revised has had reference to an eco-labelling scheme. The 
only place where I have found reference to eco-labelling is in the NAAEC. Art 10 of the 
NAAEC states that the Council may “consider, and develop recommendations 
regarding (…) eco-labelling”. The Council has discussed the issue on several 
occasions,
125
 but I will not treat this in further detail here, based on the assumption that 
the NAFTA agreement, and the NAAEC with its institutions, is by far to extensive 
compared to what a Sino-Norwegian FTA can potentially become.  
 
                                                 
123
 Vitalis, Vangelis, 2002 
124
 Center for International Environmental Law, 2005, page 18 
125
 Comission for Environmental Cooperation, 2011 
 48 
It has been claimed that there is so much confusion concerning eco-labelling that the 
WTO should take more action.
126
 The most intense period for discussions on eco-
labelling in the WTO was in the early 2000s. The debate surfaces whenever a country 
introduces a new scheme, but based on observations of WTO activity, it does not seem 
that the WTO plans on integrating eco-labelling into their trade regulations.
127
  
 
Because eco-labelling has not previously been included in Chinese or Norwegian FTAs, 
and seems too complex even for the WTO, it seems unlikely that eco-labelling will be a 
realistic alternative within the framework of a Sino-Norwegian FTA.   
 
4.3 Environmental development zones 
In the China-Singapore FTA there is an interesting provision included in the chapter on 
Economic Co-operation. Article 87 provides for Singaporean “Participation in China’s 
Regional Development”. The parties have jointly started up an eco-city project in 
Tianjin, China, and mutually agree to continue working closely to create a model city 
for sustainable development, including environmental protection and resource and 
energy conservation. This is the only specific environmental project I have found in any 
of the agreements I have studied. The project has apparently worked well, as the two 
parties have continued to meet and work together, and had their last meeting at the end 
of September 2011.
128
 So far the project has included a public housing project, a park 
and a wastewater pond.
129
 These kinds of projects, if successful, have the potential to 
influence market forces; the more local societies are involved in developing sustainable 
environments, the greater the public awareness on environmental concerns. Public 
awareness in turn influences what kind of decisions the public make as consumers. 
Although such an effect is difficult to prove, it could contribute to positive effects on 
the environment.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, one of China’s main interests in the existing Sino-
Norwegian environmental cooperation is the transfer of technology and know-how. 
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Many environmental projects between Norway and China have already been initiated 
and successfully started up in China. Norway is also interested in including 
environmental regulation and cooperation in as specific a way as possible in the FTA.
130
 
A specific environmental flag-ship project, like the one described above, could 
therefore be considered feasible in the Sino-Norwegian FTA context. It would be 
beneficial for the Chinese, ensuring the transfer of technology and environmental know-
how from Norway necessary in order to carry out the project. It would also ensure a 
long-term focus, as opposed to many of the existing cooperation projects that span only 
3-5 years.  
 
The Chinese have previously experimented with development projects in specifically 
defined geographical areas, in the so-called Special Economic Zones (SEZ). Within 
these SEZs, China has designated several cities as “model” environmental cities.131 
Chinese authorities have recently begun to see environmental regulation as an important 
feature of their development zones, attracting more business through better 
environmental management.
132
 This is an indication that the Chinese are interested in 
developing environmental regulation and management. 
 
Special environmental zones could become a mechanism for trying out different 
technologies that might be transferred to larger areas after an initial phase in the 
environmental zone. These zones could be designed such as in the China-Singapore 
FTA, or more similar to the existing Chinese “model” environmental cities. To my 
knowledge, such a specific environmental project has not yet been proposed in the 
Sino-Norwegian FTA negotiations.  
 
5 Conclusion 
There is a great range of environmental provisions that could be considered in a 
potential Sino-Norwegian FTA. In the agreements I have studied, the provisions that 
aim at mitigating negative effects from trade on the environment and enhancing positive 
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effects vary greatly. As for the clauses that correspond to the WTO environmental 
provisions, it is likely that references to the environment in the preamble and subsidies 
regulation will be included in a Sino-Norwegian FTA. Based on the fact that all but one 
of the agreements I have studied include some reference to the environment, it is 
probable that the FTA will include such reference, although the exact wording is 
difficult to predict. Reference to the SCM agreement, or similar subsidies regulation, 
will likely also be included, as all the agreements to which Norway or China are party 
and that I have studied include such regulation. Whether the parties will agree not to use 
countervailing measures in the case of subsidies for environmental development, is a 
question of political will. The type of WTO environmental provisions that I am the least 
certain will be included in a Sino-Norwegian FTA is the exception clause. Both Norway 
and China are members to agreements that include, and others that don’t include, such 
provisions. If included, it will clearly be environmentally beneficial to explicitly 
mention environmental protection in the exception clause.  
 
The clauses that aim at mitigating possible negative impacts from trade on the 
environment only occur sporadically in the agreements I have studied. Harmonisation 
clauses are uncommon, as are “not lowering standards” clauses. The inclusion of such 
clauses in a Sino-Norwegian FTA is therefore unlikely. Enforcement provisions of 
some kind, however, are more common. In the only Chinese FTA that includes a clause 
on enforcement, the parties have a right, but not an obligation to enforce their own 
environmental laws. In this regard, the inclusion of an enforcement clause is improbable 
in a Sino-Norwegian context.  
 
Of the mechanisms aimed at enhancing the positive effects of trade on the environment, 
both an environmental side agreement and the development of a special environmental 
zone seem to be mechanisms that could be realistic to include in a Sino-Norwegian 
FTA. Although not commonly included, such mechanisms already exist, and they might 
be of great benefit for both parties. Both mechanisms would be based on and develop 
the already existing environmental cooperation between Norway and China. Ecolabels, 
however, are not likely to be included. Both Norway and China already have 
ecolabelling schemes, but none of these have previously been regulated in FTAs, and 
are also probably too complex to be included in a Sino-Norwegian context.  
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2 List of Annexes  
2.1 Annex 1 - Preamble  
 
Agreement establishing 
the World Trade 
Organization (the WTO 
agreement)  
“Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and 
economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising 
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and 
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, 
and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, 
while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, 
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to 
enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their 
respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic 
development” 
China – New Zealand FTA “Mindful that economic development, social development and 
environmental protection are interdependent and mutually  
reinforcing components of sustainable development and that 
closer economic partnership can play an important role in 
promoting sustainable development” 
China –Chile FTA “Recognizing that this Agreement should be implemented with a 
view toward raising the standard of living, creating new job 
opportunities, and promoting sustainable development in a 
manner consistent with environmental protection and 
conservation” 
China – Pakistan FTA “Recognizing that this Agreement should be implemented with a 
view toward raising the standard of living, creating new job 
opportunities, and promoting sustainable development in a 
manner consistent with environmental protection and 
conservation” 
China – Peru FTA “Recognize that this Agreement should be implemented with a 
view toward raising the standard of living, creating new 
employment opportunities, reducing poverty and promoting 
sustainable development in a manner consistent with 
environmental protection and conservation” 
China – Singapore FTA none 
 
 L 
EFTA – Chile FTA “Promote environmental protection and conservation, and 
sustainable development” 
EFTA – Singapore FTA “Recognizing that trade liberalisation should allow for the optimal 
use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of 
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve 
the environment” 
EFTA – Mexico FTA “Resolved to foster environmental protection and conservation, 
and to promote sustainable development” 
EFTA – Hong Kong FTA “Determined to implement this Agreement in line with the 
objectives to preserve and protect the environment through 
sound environmental management and to promote an optimal 
use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of 
sustainable development” 
EU – South Korea FTA “Reaffirming their commitment to sustainable development and 
convinced of the contribution of international trade to sustainable 
development in its economic, social and environmental 
dimensions,  including economic development, poverty reduction, 
full and productive employment and decent work for all as well as 
the protection and preservation of the environment and natural 
resources” 
“Desiring to strengthen the development and enforcement of 
labour and environmental laws and policies, promote basic 
workers’ rights and sustainable development and implement this 
Agreement in a manner consistent with these objectives” 
EU – Mexico FTA “Mindful of the importance that both Parties attach to the proper 
implementation of the principle of sustainable development, as 
agreed and set out in Agenda 21 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development” 
EU – Chile FTA “Mindful of both Parties' desire to ensure sustainable 
development and also to conserve and protect the environment” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 M 
NAFTA “Undertake each of the preceding in a manner consistent with 
environmental protection and conservation” 
“Promote sustainable development” 
“Strengthen the development and enforcement of environmental 
laws and regulations” 
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2.2 Annex 2 - Exception clauses 
 
GATT article XX Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in 
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:  
(…) 
(b)      necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(…) 
(g)      relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources 
if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption; 
GATS article XIV Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in 
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:  
(…) 
(b)      necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 O 
 
 
 
China – New Zealand FTA 
Article 200 
1. For the purposes of this Agreement, Article XX of GATT 
1994 and its interpretative notes and Article XIV of GATS 
(including its footnotes) are incorporated into and made 
part of this Agreement, mutatis mutandis. 
2. The Parties understand that the measures referred to in 
Article XX(b) of GATT 1994 and Article XIV(b) of GATS, as 
incorporated into this Agreement, can include 
environmental measures necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health, and Article XX(g) of GATT 
1994, as incorporated into this Agreement, applies to 
measures relating to the conservation of living and 
nonliving exhaustible natural resources, subject to the 
requirement that they are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade in goods 
or services or investment. 
China –Chile FTA            
Article 99 
For the purpose of this agreement, Article XX of GATT 1994 and its 
interpretative notes are incorporated into and made part of this 
Agreement, mutatis mutandis.  
China – Pakistan FTA None 
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China – Peru FTA        
Article 193 
1. For purposes of Chapter 2 (National Treatment and 
Market Access for Goods), Chapter 3 (Rules of Origin and 
Operational Procedures Related to Origin), Chapter 4 
(Customs Procedures and Trade Facilitation), Chapter 5 
(Trade Remedies), Chapter 6 (Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures), Chapter 7 (Technical Barriers to Trade), Article 
XX of the GATT 1994 and its interpretative notes are 
incorporated into and made part of this Agreement, 
mutatis mutandis. The Parties understand that the 
measures referred to in Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994, as 
incorporated into this Agreement, can include any 
measure necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life 
or health, and that Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 applies 
to measures relating to the conservation of any 
exhaustible natural resource. 
2. For purposes of Chapter 8 (Trade in Services), Article XIV 
of the GATS (including its footnotes) is incorporated into 
and made part of this Agreement, mutatis mutandis. The 
Parties understand that the measures referred to in 
Article XIV(b) of the GATS, as incorporated into this 
Agreement, can include any measure necessary to protect 
human, animal, or plant life or health. 
China – Singapore FTA 
Article 58 
2. Where urgent problems of safety, health, consumer or 
environmental protection or national security arise or threaten to 
arise for a Party, that Party may suspend the operation of any 
Annex, in whole or in part, immediately. In such a case, the Party 
shall immediately advise the other Party of the nature of the 
urgent problem, the products covered and the objective and 
rationale of the suspension. 
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EFTA – Chile FTA             
Article 21 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in 
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination of a Party where the same conditions 
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in 
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any Party of measures: 
(…) 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(…) 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if 
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions 
on domestic production or consumption; 
EFTA – Singapore FTA 
Section II on Goods,        
Article 19 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in 
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any Party of measures:  
(…) 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(…) 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if 
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions 
on domestic production or consumption; 
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EFTA – Mexico FTA         
Article 17 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in 
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any Party of measures:  
(…) 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(…) 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if 
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions 
on domestic production or consumption; 
EFTA – Hong Kong FTA 
Article 2.15 
The rights and obligations of the Parties in respect of general 
exceptions shall be governed by Article XX of the GATT 1994, 
which is hereby incorporated into and made part of this 
Agreement, mutatis mutandis. 
EU – South Korea FTA 
Article 6.1 
With the objectives of facilitating trade and promoting customs 
cooperation on a bilateral and multilateral basis, the Parties agree 
to cooperate and to adopt and apply their import, export and 
transit requirements and procedures for goods on the basis of the 
following objectives and principles: 
(…) 
(g) measures to facilitate trade shall not prejudice the fulfillment 
of legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of national 
security, health and the environment. 
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EU – Mexico FTA         
Article 5 
In order to achieve the objective laid down in Article 4, the Joint 
Council shall decide on the arrangements and timetable for a 
bilateral, progressive and reciprocal liberalisation of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, in accordance with the 
relevant WTO rules, in particular Article XXIV of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and taking account of the 
sensitive nature of certain products. This decision shall include, in 
particular, the following matters: 
(…) 
general exceptions justified on grounds of public morality, public 
policy or public security; the protection of human, animal or plant 
life or health; the protection of industrial, intellectual and 
commercial property, inter alia; 
EU – Chile FTA none 
NAFTA                          
Article 1018 
2.Provided that such measures are not applied in a manner that 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between Parties where the same conditions prevail 
or a disguised restriction on trade between the Parties, nothing in 
this Chapter shall be construed to prevent any Party from 
adopting or maintaining measures: 
(…) 
b. necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
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NAFTA                          
Article 2101 
For purposes of: 
Part Two (Trade in Goods), except to the extent that a provision of 
that Part applies to services or investment, and 
Part Three (Technical Barriers to Trade), except to the extent that 
a provision of that Part applies to services,  
 
GATT Article XX and its interpretative notes, or any equivalent 
provision of a successor agreement to which all Parties are party, 
are incorporated into and made part of this Agreement. The 
Parties understand that the measures referred to in GATT Article 
XX(b) include environmental measures necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health, and that GATT Article XX(g) 
applies to measures relating to the conservation of living and non-
living exhaustible natural resources. 
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2.3 Annex 3 - Subsidies 
 
SCM article 3 3.1        Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the 
following subsidies, within the meaning of Article 1, shall be 
prohibited: 
(a)        subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as 
one of several other conditions, upon export performance, 
including those illustrated in Annex I; 
(b)        subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several 
other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods. 
3.2        A Member shall neither grant nor maintain subsidies 
referred to in paragraph 1. 
SCM article 5 No Member should cause, through the use of any subsidy referred 
to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 1, adverse effects to the 
interests of other Members, i.e.: 
(a)        injury to the domestic industry of another Member; 
(b)        nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or 
indirectly to other Members under GATT 1994 in particular the 
benefits of concessions bound under Article II of GATT 1994; 
(c)        serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.  
This Article does not apply to subsidies maintained on agricultural 
products as provided in Article 13 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture. 
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SCM article 8 8.2        Notwithstanding the provisions of Parts III and V, the 
following subsidies shall be non-actionable: 
(a)        assistance for research activities conducted by firms or by 
higher education or research establishments on a contract basis 
with firms (…) 
(…) 
(c)        assistance to promote adaptation of existing  facilities to 
new environmental requirements imposed by law and/or 
regulations which result in greater constraints and financial 
burden on firms, (…) 
China – New Zealand FTA 
article 61 
The Parties maintain their rights and obligations under the WTO 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Article XIX of GATT 1994 
and the Safeguards Agreement. 
China –Chile FTA         
article 52 
The Parties maintain their rights and obligations under the 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, which 
are parts of the WTO Agreement. 
China – Pakistan FTA 
article 25 
The Parties maintain their rights and obligations under the 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, which 
are parts of the WTO Agreement. 
China – Peru FTA         
article 77 (1) 
The Parties agree to abide fully by the provisions of the WTO 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994, and 
the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
China – Singapore FTA 
article 31 
The Parties agree and reaffirm their commitments to abide by 
their rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994, the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Article XIX 
of the GATT 1994, and the Safeguards Agreement. 
EFTA – Chile FTA         
article 18 (3) 
The rights and obligations of the Parties related to countervailing 
measures shall be governed by the WTO Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures. 
 W 
 
EFTA – Singapore FTA 
article 15 
The rights and obligations of the Parties in respect of subsidies 
shall be governed by Articles VI and XVI of the GATT 1994, the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and 
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. 
EFTA – Mexico FTA     
article 11 (1) 
The rights and obligations of the Parties in respect of subsidies 
and countervailing measures shall be governed by Articles VI and 
XVI of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures. 
EFTA – Hong Kong FTA 
article 2.11 (1), (2) and 
(3) 
1. Hong Kong, China and Norway shall not apply countervailing 
measures as provided for under Article VI of the GATT 1994 and 
Part V of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (hereinafter referred to as the “SCM Agreement”) in 
relation to products originating in a Party referred to in this 
paragraph. 
2. Subject to paragraph 1, the rights and obligations between 
Hong Kong, China and Norway in respect of subsidies shall be 
governed by Article XVI of the GATT 1994 and the SCM 
Agreement. 
3. The rights and obligations of Hong Kong, China, Switzerland, 
Liechtenstein and Iceland relating to subsidies and countervailing 
measures in respect of products originating in a Party referred to 
in this paragraph shall be governed by Articles VI and XVI of the 
GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement, except as provided for in 
paragraphs 4 and 5. 
4. Before any investigation is initiated by a Party referred to in 
paragraph 3 to determine the existence, degree and effect of any 
alleged subsidy in another Party, as provided for in Article 11 of 
the SCM Agreement, the Party considering initiating an 
investigation shall notify in writing the Party whose products are 
subject to an investigation and allow for 45 days, or a longer 
period if agreed by the Parties, for consultations with that Party 
with a view to finding a mutually acceptable solution.5 
5. An investigation referred to in paragraph 4 shall only be 
initiated when domestic producers expressly supporting an 
application pursuant to Article 11 of the SCM Agreement account 
for at least 50 per cent of the total production of the like products 
produced by the domestic industry.  
 
 X 
EFTA – Hong Kong FTA 
article 3.13 
1. A Party which considers that it is adversely affected by a subsidy 
of another Party may request ad hoc consultations with that Party 
on such matters. The requested Party shall enter into such 
consultations.11 
2. The Parties shall review any disciplines agreed under Article XV 
of the GATS with a view to incorporating them into this Chapter. 
EU – South Korea FTA 
article 3.8 (1) 
Except as otherwise provided for in this Chapter, the Parties 
maintain their rights and obligations under Article VI of GATT 
1994, the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 
1994, contained in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement (hereinafter 
referred to as the ‘Anti-Dumping Agreement’) and the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, contained in Annex 1A 
to the WTO Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the ‘SCM 
Agreement’). 
EU – Mexico FTA none 
EU – Chile FTA none 
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2.4 Annex 4 - Harmonisation 
 
NAAEC/NAFTA none 
China – New Zealand FTA none 
China –Chile FTA none 
China – Pakistan FTA none 
China – Peru FTA         
article 84 (1) 
In accordance with Article 3 of the SPS Agreement and the 
Decisions for the implementation of the said Article adopted by 
the WTO/SPS Committee, the Parties shall work on the 
harmonization of their respective sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, taking into account standards, guidelines and 
recommendations developed by the relevant international 
organizations. 
China – Singapore FTA none 
EFTA – Chile FTA none 
EFTA – Singapore FTA none 
EFTA – Mexico FTA none 
EFTA – Hong Kong FTA   
article 8.5 
The Parties reaffirm their commitment to the effective 
implementation in their respective domestic law and practices of 
the multilateral environmental agreements applicable to them, as 
well as their adherence to environmental principles reflected in 
the international instruments referred to in Article 8.1. 
(from article 8.1: Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment of 1972, the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development of 1992, Agenda 21 on Environment and 
Development of 1992, and the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation on Sustainable Development of 2002.) 
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EU – South Korea FTA   
article 13.1 (3) 
The Parties recognise that it is not their intention in this Chapter 
to harmonise the labour or environment standards of the Parties, 
but to strengthen their trade relations and cooperation in ways 
that promote sustainable development in the context of 
paragraphs 1 and 2. 
EU – Mexico FTA         
article 21 (2) 
To this end they shall examine, inter alia, the following: 
(a) measures to harmonise health, plant-health and 
environmental standards and rules, with a view to facilitating 
trade, taking account of the legislation in force for both Parties 
and in conformity with the rules of the WTO, in addition to the 
terms of Article 5; 
(…) 
EU – Chile FTA none 
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2.5 Annex 5 - Enforcement agreements and clauses 
 
NAAEC                          
article 5 (1) 
With the aim of achieving high levels of environmental protection 
and compliance with its environmental laws and regulations, each 
Party shall effectively enforce its environmental laws and 
regulations through appropriate governmental action 
China – New Zealand 
Environmental 
Cooperation Agreement   
article 1 (1) 
The Parties respect the sovereign rights of each country to set its 
own policies and national priorities and to set, administer and 
enforce its own environmental laws and regulations 
China –Chile FTA None  
China – Pakistan FTA none 
China – Peru FTA none 
China – Singapore FTA none 
EFTA – Chile FTA none 
EFTA – Singapore FTA none 
EFTA – Mexico FTA none 
EFTA – Hong Kong FTA   
article 8.4 
1. The Parties will faithfully enforce their environmental laws, 
regulations and standards. 
2. Subject to Article 8.3, a Party will not: (a) weaken or reduce the 
level of environmental protection provided by its laws, 
regulations or standards with the sole intention to encourage 
investment from another Party or to seek or enhance a 
competitive trade advantage of producers or service providers 
operating in that Party; or (b) waive or otherwise derogate from, 
or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such laws, 
regulations or standards in order to encourage investment from 
another Party or to seek or enhance a competitive trade 
advantage of producers or service providers operating in that 
Party. 
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EU – South Korea FTA   
article 6.1 (g) 
With the objectives of facilitating trade and promoting customs 
cooperation on a bilateral and multilateral basis, the Parties agree 
to cooperate and to adopt and apply their import, export and 
transit requirements and procedures for goods on the basis of the 
following objectives and principles: 
(…) 
measures to facilitate trade shall not prejudice the fulfilment of 
legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of national 
security, health and the environment. 
EU – Mexico FTA none 
EU – Chile FTA none 
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2.6 Annex 6 - Not lowering standards 
 
NAAEC                          
article 3 
Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own levels of 
domestic environmental protection and environmental 
development policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify 
accordingly its environmental laws and regulations, each Party 
shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high levels of 
environmental protection and shall strive to continue to improve 
those laws and regulations.  
China – New Zealand FTA none 
China –Chile FTA None 
China – Pakistan FTA none 
China – Peru FTA none 
China – Singapore FTA none 
EFTA – Chile FTA none 
EFTA – Singapore FTA none 
EFTA – Mexico FTA none 
EFTA – Hong Kong FTA   
article 8.3 
Recognising the right of each Party to establish its own level of 
environmental protection and to adopt or modify accordingly its 
domestic law and policies in a manner consistent with this 
Agreement, each Party will seek to ensure that its domestic law, 
policies and practices provide for and encourage high levels of 
environmental protection, consistent with standards, principles 
and agreements referred to in Article 8.5, and will strive to further 
improve the level of protection provided for in domestic law and 
policies. 
EU – South Korea FTA   
article 1.1 (2) (h) 
to promote foreign direct investment without lowering or 
reducing environmental, labour or occupational health and safety 
standards in the application and enforcement of environmental 
and labour laws of the Parties. 
EU – Mexico FTA none 
EU – Chile FTA none  
 
